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This study grounds the establishment of EMU and the euro in the context of the history of international
monetary cooperation and of monetary unions, above all in the U.S., Germany and Italy. The purpose
of national monetary unions was to reduce transactions costs of multiple currencies and thereby facilitate
commerce; to reduce exchange rate volatility; and to prevent wasteful competition for seigniorage.
By contrast, supranational unions, such as the Latin Monetary Union or the Scandinavian Currency
Union were conducted in the broader setting of an international monetary order, the gold standard.
There are closer parallels between EMU and national monetary unions. Historical monetary unions
also were associated with fiscal unions (fiscal federalism). Both fiscal and monetary unions were an
important part of the process of political unification. In the past, central banks, and the currencies they
managed, have been discredited or put under severe strain as a result of: severe or endemic fiscal problems
creating pressures for the monetization of public debt; low economic growth may produce demands
for central banks to pursue more expansionary policies; regional strains producing a demand for different
monetary policies to adjust to particular regional pressures; severe crises of the financial system; and
tensions between the international and the domestic role of a leading currency.  In particular, there
is the possibility for the EMU that low rates of growth will produce direct challenges to the management
of the currency, and a demand for a more politically controlled and for a more expansive monetary
policy.  Such demands might arise in some parts or regions or countries of the euro area, but not in














EMU  and the euro, the single currency of its members, will be ten years old in 2009. 
Monetary Unions as currency arrangements have been implemented for a few centuries, 
but the European experiment of embarking on a monetary union without an 
accompanying full political union is bold and unprecedented.  Monetary union has run 
ahead of the process of fiscal integration.  EMU has helped to develop an integrated 
capital market, as well as providing many obvious consumer benefits in convenience and 
price transparency for an increasingly mobile European population.  However, the 
novelty of the single currency while accompanied by divided sovereignty raises a number 
of problems and potential threats, some of which were anticipated at the time of the 
institutional preparations for monetary union, while others were not. 
 
This essay will evaluate the experience of the first decade of EMU and the euro in 
historical perspective. It will ground the establishment of EMU and the euro in the 
context of the history of international monetary cooperation and of monetary unions. A 
discussion of the origins, key operating characteristics and problems encountered by 
earlier monetary arrangements will serve as a backdrop for an evaluation of the euro’s 
performance and challenges in future decades. The essay will develop and expand upon 
the following three themes: 1. Lessons from the evolution of past monetary unions for 
EMU; 2. Fiscal policy arrangements for EMU in historical perspective; 3. Challenges 
facing EMU. The first two take an historical perspective. The third looks to the future. 
 
1.  Lessons from the evolution of past monetary unions for EMU. 
 
A monetary union, defined as a common currency and set of monetary arrangements 
(including cooperation among central banks and a common central bank) for a group of 
member states is a form of international monetary cooperation. In the past international 
monetary regimes evolved to facilitate international commerce. The earliest regime, the 
international specie standard, in its most well known variety, the gold standard, emerged 
de facto because participating countries defined (pegged) their currencies in terms of a 
common precious metal. This led to a fixed exchange rate arrangement which in the late 
nineteenth century encouraged international trade and capital movements. The limitations 
on government fiscal and monetary action implied by the gold standard enhanced policy 
credibility, and consequently reduced the cost of borrowing for both governments and 
private actors (Bordo and Rockoff 1996).  Central banks by following the rule of gold 
convertibility implicitly cooperated with each other. In some cases direct cooperation was 
arranged. In the twentieth century, more explicit forms of monetary cooperation  evolved, 
first with the Gold Exchange Standard in the 1920s, then the Tripartite agreement in the 
1930s and  then with the Bretton Woods Articles of Agreement in 1944, which required 
all members  to adhere to a set parity and to other rules.  
 
Monetary unions of the past were set up under two circumstances: as international 
arrangements between countries using similar specie currencies, to harmonize interstate 
transactions  and as part of the creation of a nation state from a number of smaller 
political units. In the latter case case monetary unification was part of the process of 
nation building which was combined with the creation of a fiscal union. A common   3
currency was seen as a way to avoid the costs of currency competition and currency 
instability among the member states. 
 
International monetary unions of the past were successful as long as the international 
environment was stable. Large shocks such as wars led to their dissolution. National 
monetary unions were also successful as long as the nation was politically cohesive. It 
took the historical national MUs decades to establish the necessary integration of goods 
and factor markets and the creation of well functioning central banks. The greater success 
of some MUs over others reflected their patterns of economic development and evolution 
of sound financial institutions and sound monetary and fiscal policies. 
 
1.1  The history of monetary unions
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A monetary union or a unified currency area is the extreme version of a fixed exchange 
rate regime. The essence of a monetary union is that all the member states adopt the same 
currency as a unit of account, medium of exchange and store of value.This implies that 
the monetary union has one exchange rate towards the rest of the world. 
 
The history of monetary unions is best understood if we make a distinction between 
national and multinational monetary unions. By a national monetary union we mean that 
political and monetary sovereignty go hand in hand.  Roughly speaking, the borders of 
the nation state are the borders of the monetary area. A national monetary union has as a 
rule one single monetary authority, commonly a central bank. 
 
By a multinational monetary union we mean an international monetary arrangement 
between independent countries based on permanently fixed exchange rates between their 
currencies. Multinational monetary unions occur when independent nation states link 
their monies together through a perfectly fixed exchange rate so that one member’s 
money is perfectly exchangeable for another member’s at a fixed price. An extreme 
example of this would be that all member states use the same currency. 
 
A second important distinction is between the monetary union per se and the type of 
monetary policy pursued within the union. Adoption of a common money by a number of 
states can be consistent with alternative sets of institutional arrangements governing 
monetary policy, ranging from complete laissez faire to monolithic central banking. As 
we demonstrate below monetary unions, once created, differed substantially depending 
on the evolution of monetary institutions. The currencies could be unified without 
specifying any particular rule for governing monetary policy as will be seen from the 
examples of the U.S., German and Italian monetary unions and two multinational 
monetary unions, the Latin Monetary Union( LMU) and the Scandanavian monetary 
union ( SMU). 
 
1.2 National Monetary Unions. 
 
1.2.1  The United States 
                                                 
1  See Bordo and Jonung 2003.   4
 
The U.S. monetary union was created with the signing of the constitution in 1789. The 
constitution gave the Congress the sole power to “coin money” and “regulate the value 
thereof”. Moreover, the Coinage Act of 1792 defined the U.S. dollar in terms of fixed 
weights of gold and silver coins, placing the country on a bimetallic standard. Finally, 
establishment of a national mint in Philadelphia in 1792 secured the foundations of an 
effective currency area. 
 
In the preceding two centuries, the colonial experience was chequered with examples of 
excessive issue of paper money, “the bills of credit”, leading to high inflation as well as 
competing seigniorage between the colonies. This experience was repeated after 
independence during the Confederation period 1793 to 1789. The Constitution of 1789 
was designed expressly to avoid giving the states the power to issue paper money and to 
preserve the control of the currency  for the Congress. 
 
While the Congress was given the exclusive power to coin money, the States were 
allowed to charter commercial banks and to regulate their note issuing activity. All bank 
notes had to be convertible into specie. In the early decades of the 19
th century, bank note 
issue varied considerably and various state bank notes circulated at a discount. Moreover 
there is evidence that the price level may have been higher in the west than the east. 
 
The movement towards a complete currency union with a more uniform nationwide price 
level was aided by the practices of the First Bank of the United States (1791-1811) and 
the Second Bank of the United States (1816-1836). Neither bank was designed as a 
central bank but as a public bank. Both banks were sufficiently well capitalized to be able 
to provide the government with medium–term bridge loans to finance shortfalls in 
government tax receipts. Both were also intended to provide loans to the private sector to 
spur economic development. Finally, it was deemed imperative that they hold sufficient 
specie reserves to always maintain convertibility of their notes. One of the practices of 
both Banks was to enforce the convertibility of state bank note issues and to transfer 
specie between regions. 
 
After the demise of the Second Bank of the United States in 1836, the United States did 
not have any form of a central bank until the establishment of the Federal Reserve 
System in 1914. However the U.S. Treasury served as a monetary authority and 
maintained specie convertibility. Although the 19
th century was characterized by 
considerable banking instability, the currency union remained intact with the exception of 
the Civil War period when the Confederate States issued their own fiat currency. In the 
face of great difficulties in raising tax revenues and in selling debt both at home and 
abroad, the Confederate government expanded its money issues at an ever increasing rate. 
By the end of the Civil War a hyperinflation vastly reduced the value of Confederate 
notes. Upon Union victory in April 1865, Confederate notes were declared illegal in the 
United States. The National Banking system, established in 1865 , finally created a 
uniform national bank note system. Several different types of high powered money: gold 
coins, silver coins, gold and silver certificates, and U.S. notes ( greenbacks) circulated at 
par for the next half century until the creation of the Federal Reserve system in 1914,   5
which issued Federal Reserve notes. Although bank notes now circulated across the 
country at par, demand deposits did not, charges for check clearing varied depending on 
the distance from the East coast money centers. The Fed instituted par checking for the 
member banks, not nonmembers, eliminating the final hurdle to par acceptance of all 
forms of money. 
 
The Federal Reserve System consisted of 12 regional Reserve Banks coordinated by the 
Board of Governors in Washington DC. As described by Eichengreen (1997a, 1997 b) 
and Wheelock ( 2000), the Reserve Banks initially had some monetary independence 
within their respective regions with the power to set discount rates. Regional conflicts 
over the conduct of monetary policy occurred throughout the 1920s and 1930s, and many 
scholars believe that those conflicts were an important part of the paralysis in decision 
making that helped create the Great Depression ( Friedman and Schwartz 1963 and 
Meltzer 2004). It was only with the Banking Act of 1935 that full power to implement 
monetary policy was given to the Board of Governors. Thus monetary unification of the 
United States was not finalized until long after political unification. 
 
1.2.2 The Italian Monetary Union 
 
The main reason for the establishment of a currency union on the Appenine peninsula in 
the 1860s was political unification under the leadership of the Kingdom of Sardinia.  The 
Kingdom of Italy was proclaimed in 1861, and completed in stages in 1866 and 1871. 
Prior to unification as many as 90 different metallic currencies were legal tender in the 
many small Italian states. In addition, major banks in the small states issued bank notes 
that served as legal tender. The variety of different currencies was commonly regarded as 
a barrier to trade. In order to achieve more than a de jure unified Italy, measures were 
taken to turn the country into a monetary union as well.  
 
The issue of coins was quickly resolved. During a brief transition period, four currencies 
were accepted while all other old currencies were exchanged into these. Finally, in 1862, 
a new, unified coinage was introduced based on the lira of Sardinia. All pre-unification 
coins and paper monies were abolished and exchanged for coins denominated in the new 
lira, equal in value to the French franc. A bimetallic currency standard was preferred, 
primarily to conform to the monetary system of Italy’s major trading partners and to 
accommodate the dominance of silver coins in southern Italy. The currency ratio between 
silver and gold was set at the French ratio of 15.5 to 1. 
 
 Although Italy had unified its coinage in 1862, it had considerable difficulty in 
remaining on the specie standard in which its currency was defined. In 1862, Italy 
adopted the bimetallic standard, although de facto the standard was gold. In 1865 Italy 
joined the Latin Monetary Union (see section 1.8.1 below). Fiscal improvidence and the 
war of unification against Austria in 1866, however ended convertibility (with a new 
regime known as the Corso Forsozo). Fiscal and monetary discipline was achieved by 
1874, and exchange rate parity was restored. The government announced on March 1, 
1883, that it would restore convertibility on April 12, 1884 but convertibility only took 
place in silver because it was overvalued at the mint. Public finances then deteriorated   6
and unlawful bank note issues indicated an absence of monetary discipline. By 1894 Italy 
was back on a paper standard, and floating exchange rates. Inconvertibility lasted until 
1927. 
 
It took Italy 30 years to establish a central bank. No immediate action was taken to 
establish a single monetary authority. Several regional banks were issuing notes as well 
as performing central bank functions. The Banca Nazionale nel Regno d’Italia ( BNR), 
which was formed by the previous national bank of Sardinia, absorbing some other state 
banks in the process, held a leading position among banks, however, partly by being the 
largest bank in operation and partly by being the bank of the state that led the political 
unification process.  
 
In the following decades a number of competing banks of issue coexisted. By 1884 the 
number had declined to six. There has been considerable debate on whether the existence 
of multiple banks of issue was per se inflationary or whether the lack of fiscal difference 
and intermittent departures from specie were the causes of the inflationary episodes 
(Fratianni and Spinelli 1997). An enquiry into the state of the banking system led to a 
major restructuring in 1893. The Banca d’Italia was formed as an amalgamation between 
the BNR and the two remaining Tuscan banks. The three remaining note-issuing banks 
were put under direct state supervision. In sum, the formation of the Italian monetary 
union, as was the case with the U.S., took place after political unification and it was a 
time consuming process. 
 
1.2.3  The German Monetary Union 
 
The German monetary- as well as political-unification process proceeded stepwise. Prior 
to monetary unification, each principality and free town issued its own coins and  in 
addition a multiplicity of issue banks gave out paper money. In addition, large numbers 
of foreign coins circulated.  The diversity of coins was perceived as a great nuisance. 
Merchants and industrialists, often  with a liberal orientation, became the main proponent 
of unified economic and monetary conditions to reduce transactions cost emanating from 
monetary disarray, while the governments of the principalities resisted, safeguarding their 
seigniorage gains. 
 
In 1834, under the Zollverein, all internal customs barriers were removed. The 1838 
Dresden Coinage Convention brought some simplification, with southern states adopting 
the Gulden and northern states the Thaler.   Both the Thaler and the Gulden were 
explicitly linked to silver, with one Thaler being valued at 1.75 Gulden. The Vienna 
Coinage Treaty of 1857 constituted a further step towards monetary unification. The 
Treaty incorporporated Austria into the Dresden arrangement by fixing the exchange rate 
of 1 Thaler to 1.5 Austrian Gulden and to 1.75 south German Gulden. In addition, the 
amount of petty coins that each state could issue was regulated. The circulation of gold 
coins, previously left to the discretion of each state, now became subject to stringent 
rules. No gold coins other than special Vereinshandelsgoldmünze designed for foreign 
trade were minted. The exchange of gold coins into silver at a fixed parity was forbidden 
as well, avoiding the risk of turning the currency standard into a bimetallic one.   7
Secondly, the treaty dealt with paper money, the first international monetary arrangement 
to do so, by prohibiting the granting of legal tender status to inconvertible paper money. 
 
The establishment of the new unified German empire following Germany’s war of 
unification (the Franco-Prussian) war induced further steps. The coinage acts of 1871 and 
1873 unified coinage throughout the empire and introduced the Mark as the unit of 
account, based on the decimal system. Individual states continued to have their own 
coinage, with images of their rulers on the heads of their now standardized coins.  In 
order to link the German currency to the British pound, at the time the leading currency, 
the gold standard was adopted with silver being reduced to use in coins of small 
denominations with less metal content than their face value. In 1875 a new banking act 
created a new central bank, the Reichsbank, and forced most of the other issue banks to 
restrict themselves to ordinary banking business. The Reichsbank was to serve as the 
central bank for the new Germany. 
 
 From the 1870s to the outbreak of World War I, Germany was part of the international 
gold standard. German monetary conditions were determined by international ones. 
Political unification epitomized by the creation of the German Reich was followed by 
three major changes in the German monetary system: the conversion of the currency 
standard from silver to gold; the replacement of the Thaler with the Mark as the unit of 
account and the formation of a single central bank that in practice monopolized the 
issuing of paper money. These changes meant that Germany after a lengthy process was a 
full-fledged monetary union. Again monetary unification followed political unification, 
with concessions being made in the form of coinage design to people who still clung to 
the old states that made up the new federally organized empire (James 1997). 
 
1.3 Multinational monetary unions 
 
We consider two multinational monetary unions, the Latin and Scandinavian monetary 
unions. Both were based on a common coinage but where each member country retained 
its central bank. 
 
1.3.1 The Latin Monetary Union 
 
The Latin Monetary Union ( LMU) was created in 1865  by France, Belgium, 
Switzerland and Italy. Prior to its establishment these countries had a history of 
recognizing each other’s currencies as means of payment based on the French bimetallic 
system, in operation since 1803. The French system stipulated that the fineness of each 
coin, regardless of whether it was a gold or silver coin, was to be 90 percent  and fixed 
the value between gold and silver to 15.5. (Redish 2000 ). 
 
In the 1850s, a fall in the price of gold relative to silver made gold coins overvalued at 
the mint. Consequently it became profitable to melt silver coins and sell silver for gold at 
the market rate. As the price of gold continued to fall, even worn coins with low silver 
content started to disappear. The process left the countries virtually with a gold standard 
currency since gold was the only medium of exchange that remained in circulation.   8
However the shortage of silver coins meant a lack of small denomination monies for use 
in minor transactions. 
 
Switzerland was the first country to enact a feasible solution by reducing the silver 
content to 80 percent of all coins except the five franc coin, thus ensuring that it was no 
longer profitable to export the newly reduced value silver coins. Italy, upon unification, 
decided to lower the silver content of every coin smaller than one franc to 83.5 percent. 
The result of Italian and Swiss actions was that France and Belgium were flooded by 
debased silver coins from their neighbors creating seigniorage gains for the issuers. 
France reacted in 1864 by reducing the silver content in each silver coin, except the 5 
franc coin, to Italy’s 83.5 percent and by suspending the acceptance of Swiss coins by her 
customs offices (Einaudi 2001). 
 
Thus there was an apparent need for coordination. The acute shortage of small 
denomination coins constituted a hindrance to trade both within and between countries 
and forced the countries into action to remedy the problem. The unilateral response by 
each country of creating token coins of varying fineness created an additional problem in 
the form of one country reaping seigniorage benefits at the expense of the others.  To deal 
with this situation, Belgium proposed a joint monetary conference, held at the end of 
1865 that created the LMU. 
 
The main issues at the conference in 1865 were to secure and standardize the supply of 
subsidiary coinage for smaller transactions and the formal adoption of gold as the 
currency standard. The first issue was unanimously resolved by deciding that all silver 
coins less in value than the five franc coin were to be token coins with 83.5 percent silver 
fineness which the state treasuries had to accept as payment up to 100 francs regardless 
of the country of origin. Each state treasury was then obliged to exchange the other state 
treasury’s holdings of its token coins into gold or silver five franc coins at par. The total 
value of token coins that each country was permitted to mint was restricted to six francs 
per capita. The adoption of a gold standard was rejected in favor of retaining the 
bimetallic standard. 
 
The existing currencies continued to be in use virtually unchanged as parallel currencies. 
Each state treasury remained ultimately responsible for the redemption of its own coins. 
Apart from solving the problem of scarcity of small denomination coins, the purpose of 
the standardization of the dimension and metal content of the coins was to eliminate the 
possibility of seigniorage gains through the minting of debased coins. While aiming to 
restrict the amount of money in circulation, the conference failed to consider restrictions 
preventing the member countries from issuing other forms of money- a failure that was to 
be exploited by the issue of paper notes. Consequently the members still had considerable 
monetary independence. 
 
Initially, the union achieved what it had set out to achieve. However two problems soon 
emerged. After the inauguration of the union, the price of gold started to rise again, and 
led to silver 5 franc coins returning to circulation and gold coins being exported or 
melted. At the same time, France and Italy began to issue inconvertible paper money. In   9
the case of France, it was a temporary measure due to the Franco-Prussian war in 1870-
71. Italy’s chronic government deficit preserved inconvertibility of the lira until 1881 and 
then introduced it again in 1894. The increased money supply in Italy led to a 
depreciation of the lira. Consequently, Italian silver coins were exported to the other 
member countries where they were legal tender. Obviously, this enabled the Italian 
government to finance part of her deficits with seigniorage, the costs of which were 
shared between all four countries. 
 
In response to the problems facing the union, a conference by the members in 1874 
decided to maintain the bimetallic standard but restrict the minting of silver five franc 
coins. In 1878 the members agreed to cease issuing five franc silver coins although those 
still in circulation were to remain legal tender, and the silver coins remained as in effect 
token coinage. This arrangement established the “limping gold standard’. 
 
As the relative price of gold continued to rise, the union in 1885 considered full adoption 
of the gold standard and thus withdrawing the 5 franc silver coins. The main problem was 
once again the cost of redeeming silver in circulation, since the intrinsic value of silver 
was now far below its face value. In the end , this proved too great an obstacle to 
overcome and a new agreement was signed stipulating that any party leaving the union 
would have to exchange the others’ holdings of its silver coins into gold. 
 
World War I led to the break-up of the LMU. The sharp increase in military expenditures 
left the members with no choice but to issue paper money. The large quantities of fiat 
issued during the war remained in circulation after hostilities ended. As paper money was 
not recognized as legal tender in any country other than the issuing one, the union was in 
effect put out of business. During the war, silver coins were melted or exported. The 
remaining coins constituted a small share of the total money supply. Belgium was the 
first country to act accordingly, declaring in 1925 that she would leave the union  at the 
start of 1927. The other countries followed and the LMU was dissolved. 
 
 
 1.3.2 The Scandinavian Monetary Union 
 
Prior to the formation of the Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU) in 1873, the three 
Scandinavian countries had a long history of similar units of account and exchange of 
notes and coins between them (Bergman, Gerlach and Jonung 1993). They were all on 
the silver standard and they all used the riksdaler as the unit of account. One Norwegian 
specierigsdaler was roughly equal to two Danish rigsdaler which in turn was roughly 
equal to four Swedish riksdaler. In consequence, a considerable fraction of the coin 
circulation in either of the three countries consisted of coins minted in the other two. The 
difference in value separating these exchange rates from the exchange rates based on the 
currencies’ values in silver was small enough in the case of the Danish and Norwegian 
currencies for any profits that could have arisen from arbitrage to be negligible. This was 
not the case for the Swedish currency whose value exceeded 0.5 Danish or 0.25 
Norwegian riksdaler by an amount sufficiently large to produce an inflow of Danish and 
Norwegian coins into Sweden to be perceived as a nuisance.   10
 
In addition to this currency flow there were other reasons for aiming at a unified coinage. 
There was a lively debate across Scandinavia over which metal-gold or silver would be 
most suitable for the monetary standard. There also was discussion regarding the merits 
of basing the unit of account on the decimal system. The intellectual climate favored the 
decimal system on the grounds of rationality and adherence to the gold standard – the 
standard followed by the leading commercial nations Britain and Germany. In addition 
the nationalistic movement called Scandinavism fostered social and political willingness 
to bring the Nordic countries closer together.  All of these factors contributed to the three 
countries creating a common currency in 1873. Norway did not formally sign the 
agreement until 1875, but in practice altered her monetary standard in 1873. 
 
The formation of the SMU in 1873 replaced the old unit of account, the riksdaler, with a 
new one, the krona, which was specified in terms of gold and was to be equal in all three 
countries. Subsidiary coins were to be minted in silver and copper with a fineness of 80 
percent and no restrictions were placed on the amount of subsidiary coins minted. All 
coins were given legal tender status throughout the union. The state treasuries accepted 
unlimited amounts of coins irrespective of their country of origin. The only restrictions 
were a maximum amount stipulated for the settlement of private debts. 
 
Notes were used widely in Sweden because of the larger denominations of the gold coins. 
Intercountry circulation consisted of notes and subsidiary coins. This caused some 
dissatisfaction since notes were not covered by the union agreement and thus did not 
always circulate at par. 
 
In 1885 the three central banks decided to establish inter-country drawing rights. 
Transactions between the central banks were made free of interest and other charges. 
Then in 1894 Sweden and Norway further extended the scope of the union by accepting 
each others notes at par without restrictions. The Danish central bank joined the 
agreement in 1901. 
 
The SMU worked smoothly in the years before World War I. The gold standard, by 
requiring convertibility into gold, ensured stability in the money supply. All three 
countries avoided issuing excessive amounts of subsidiary coins. The money supply in 
the member countries expanded in line with economic growth. Inflation rates and interest 
rates exhibited identical patterns in Scandinavia during the union.  
 
 Like the LMU, the SMU’s collapse was induced by World War I. At the outbreak of the 
war, Scandinavian notes were declared inconvertible into gold. At the same time, in order 
to prevent an outflow of gold, the export of gold was prohibited. Money growth ceased to 
be tied to the supply of gold and the basis for the exchange of Scandinavian notes at par 
was eliminated. Monetary policy was more expansive in Denmark and Norway than in 
Sweden. In 1915, the official exchange rates changed accordingly with one Swedish 
krona buying more than one Danish or Norwegian krona. 
   11
Since the legal tender status of Scandinavian coins in all Scandinavian countries was still 
in force, Danish and Norwegian gold coins were exported to Sweden. The governments 
in Denmark and Norway often granted exemptions from the prohibition of export of gold 
coins. The Swedish central bank objected to the inflow of gold coins. Negotiations were 
opened in order to achieve the suspension of the legal tender arrangement. Neither 
Denmark nor Norway wished to terminate it however, and the outcome in 1917 was 
instead a strict enforcement of the prohibition of gold exports. 
 
 At the end of the war, the three Scandinavian currencies were no longer traded at par. 
Gold coins could not circulate across borders because of the ban on gold exports. In 
virtually all respects the SMU had been rendered ineffective by the war. The only 
remaining parts of the original agreement were the legal tender and equal value status and 
unrestricted minting and flow of subsidiary coins. Because the Swedish coins were more 
valuable than Danish and Norwegian coins, subsidiary coins flowed into Sweden. To 
come to terms with this situation, a supplementary agreement was put into force in 1924 
which stated that, without regard to the coinage treaty of 1873, each country could only 
issue new subsidiary coins that was legal tender in the issuing country, thus phasing out 
the common subsidiary coins in circulation. The union was effectively terminated by the 
decision. 
 
1.4 Lessons from the Historical Record. 
 
The past monetary unions we have described were demarcated into the categories of 
national and multinational. The evolution of the former set of arrangements was tied up 
closely with the creation of nascent national states in the three countries we examined. 
The economic case for monetary unification in each of them was clear: to reduce 
transactions costs of multiple currencies and thereby facilitate commerce; to reduce 
exchange rate volatility; and to prevent wasteful competition for seigniorage. The 
multinational monetary unions were set up for basically similar economic reasons but 
there was no underlying political imperative to create a nation state. The two international 
unions we examined were part of a more general international monetary standard based 
on specie and although the members had central banks, the scope for following monetary 
policies inconsistent with the rules of the gold standard regime were limited. This made 
coordination between the monetary authorities relatively easy. 
 
This key distinction between the two types of arrangements was reflected in their 
durability. The national monetary unions we describe have endured for two centuries 
reflecting the cohesion of their underlying nation states. The record was not without 
serious strains produced by political forces, witness the American Civil War and the 
postwar division between West and East Germany. There have been prominent 
dissolutions in the twentieth century of national monetary unions which reflected the 
breakup of their underlying polities, for instance Austria-Hungary, the USSR, 
Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. But the key element in the survival of these unions has 
always been political. 
   12
 In the case of the international monetary unions we have covered, dissolution occurred 
when faced with the large exogenous shock of World War I. The exigencies of war put 
the various member states on divergent paths of monetary and fiscal rectitude. The 
underlying common nominal anchor, gold convertibility, became inconsistent with 
pressing national goals. Moreover both the LMU and SCU were part of a broader 
international monetary system which because of its common basis of adherence to specie 
also implicitly fostered monetary cooperation (although not as clearly demarcated as by 
the MUs). Like the two regional sub arrangements, it   collapsed with the strains of the 
war. In the postwar the gold exchange standard and Bretton Woods were arrangements 
which combined the discipline of gold adherence with the flexibility of allowing 
domestic financial authorities to pursue domestic stability goals. In both cases the 
regimes ultimately collapsed because of the incompatibility between the two goals. 
 
An additional lesson is the role of the monetary authority in the two types of 
arrangements. The national MUs all developed central banks as part of the process of 
monetary unification. It took a long time in each of the three examples for this process to 
reach fruition and for the central banks to provide monetary stability. The path was far 
from smooth as seen in the U.S. case in the destruction of the two Banks of the U.S. in 
the early nineteenth century and the Federal Reserve’s massive failure in the 1930s; in 
Germany in hyperinflations after the two world wars; and in Italy in monetary instability 
for most of the Banca d’Italia’s existence. The multinational MU’s we examine kept 
separate monetary authorities. Cooperation between them was focused primarily on the 
limited goals of maintaining compatible coinages and in the case of the SCU the 
international clearing of bank notes .They did not engage in policy coordination in the 
modern sense in part because given the common adherence to the gold standard it was 
not necessary. 
 
EMU is different from the earlier experiences with monetary unification that we have 
described. It has created a single currency, the euro and a common monetary authority, 
the ECB, like in the case of the national MUs, but the member states have kept a 
substantial part of their political sovereignty and, as will be discussed in section 2, their 
fiscal sovereignty. Also like the historic gold standard the EMU has a common nominal 
anchor, the commitment by the ECB to price stability, albeit in a fiat regime. A key 
potential problem as in the case of the earlier international monetary arrangements and 
the multinational MUs is conflict between national agendas for growth and full 
employment, a problem which is related to the incidence and severity of potential 
asymmetric shocks. Here political will in either driving towards greater political 
integration or in the creation of cooperative fiscal arrangements will be vital for the 
underlying durability of the EMU. 
 
2. Fiscal policy arrangements for EMU in historical perspective 
 
National MUs of the past, like Germany, Italy and the United States, which in some 
respects served as prototypes for the EMU also evolved as fiscal unions with either a   13
centralized fiscal authority or fiscal federalism with revenue sharing. In this section we 
consider some theoretical and historical perspectives on fiscal unions.
2  
 
2.1  Theoretical perspectives : fiscal unions and fiscal federalism. 
 
The concept of a fiscal union entails fiscal federalism or some other kind of cooperative 
arrangement between the members regarding the rules designed to allow the long run 
sustainability of fiscal positions. Fiscal federalism defines the roles of the different levels 
of government and the way in which they relate to one another through different 
instruments like grants and transfers. 
 
The traditional theory of fiscal federalism contends that the central (federal) government 
should have the basic responsibility for macroeconomic stabilization and income 
distribution. It also provides national public goods.  According to the theory, 
decentralized levels of government should provide goods and services whose 
consumption is linked to their own jurisdictions. The economic argument for providing 
public goods at the sub-national level is based on the Decentralization Theorem, namely 
that “the level of welfare will always be as high if Pareto-efficient levels of consumption 
are provided in each jurisdiction than if any single, uniform level of consumption is 
maintained across all jurisdictions.” (Oates 1972). 
 
The most obvious cost of federalism is the loss of autonomy by the central government. 
In fact, the advantages of decentralization require that the central government’s authority 
be limited. As a result, in highly decentralized fiscal federations, central governments 
might find it difficult to implement coordinated policies and provide federation wide 
collective goods. 
 
That decentralized governments will provide the efficient level of public goods depends 
on three assumptions: a) households are freely mobile and generate competition between 
jurisdictions. If this is not the case, competition among local governments can lead to 
sub-optimal outcomes; b) the lack of interdependencies between jurisdictions. When 
interdependencies are significant, competition among local governments can generate 
spillovers; c) a federation should be properly structured and its actions disciplined. 
 
Thus if there are strong interdependencies between sub-national jurisdictions, local 
officials may face incentives to increase their expenditure while externalizing the costs to 
others. This incentive is higher if the central government cannot fully commit to a no-
bailout rule. And the central government’s commitment becomes less credible if sub-
central governments are heavily dependent on transfers from the central authority. 
 
The interplay between several fiscal and one monetary authority can lead to free riding. 
Each individual fiscal authority sees itself as a small player who has little impact on 
monetary policy. In equilibrium each country free rides and the outcome is worse than in 
a cooperative equilibrium. An extensive literature has analyzed the existence of 
independent fiscal authorities with a single central bank (Dixit and Lambertini 2001, 
                                                 
2  See Bordo, Jonung and Markiewicz 2007.     14
Chari and Kehoe 2004, Uhlig 2002).  In line with the proposition by Rodden (2004 and 
2006), these studies point out that a setup of a single monetary authority and numerous 
fiscal authorities  requires effective fiscal policy constraints to avoid excessive deficits at 
the sub-central level. 
 
2.2 Theoretical Perspectives: Optimum Currency Areas 
 
The classical case for a fiscal union accompanying a monetary union is the theory of 
Optimum Currency Areas pioneered by Mundell (1961), Kenen (1969) and McKinnon 
(1963). The original OCA approach weighed the benefits of adopting a single currency 
against the costs of abandoning independent monetary policy. The benefits of adopting a 
single currency and a single monetary policy are the reduction of transactions costs of 
using multiple currencies. These benefits would be greater the more open and the more 
extensive the trade connections are for the economies involved. The costs occur in the 
face of shocks which hit the members asymmetrically. Adjustment to such shocks can be 
facilitated by flexible wages and prices and by labor mobility. If these mechanisms do not 
function well then this approach makes the case for a common fiscal authority or a formal 
fiscal arrangement (fiscal federalism) to transfer resources from the members facing 
positive shocks to those facing negative shocks.  
 
Mundell (1973), referred to as Mundell II in distinction to his 1961 article ( McKinnon 
2004), argued that in the case of free capital mobility, the exchange rate becomes a target 
for speculative movements and a source of asymmetric shocks. Hence abandoning a 
flexible exchange rate is an additional benefit of a currency union. Therefore a country 
might be interested in joining a currency union even if other adjustment mechanisms are 
not well developed. More recently it has been argued that financial integration leads to 
the development of market based risk – sharing arrangements which will offset the 
effects of asymmetric shocks and obviate the need for additional fiscal stabilizing 
instruments. 
 
Two market based mechanisms can provide private agents insurance against negative 
idiosyncratic shocks and hence ameliorate the negative consequences of EMU: an 
internationally diversified portfolio can protect private individuals from  a negative 
idiosyncratic shock to their domestic assets and borrowing and lending can smooth 
consumption. 
 
Finally Frankel and Rose (2003) have argued that areas which do not qualify ex ante as 
OCAs may actually ex post become OCAs. They present evidence that ex post 
integration of goods and capital markets follows monetary unions. In rationalizing 
production across national boundaries, the asymmetry of real output movements between 
markets is reduced and hence there is less of a need either for fiscal transfers or for the 
preservation of independent monetary policies. 
 
2.3 Empirical Evidence 
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An extensive empirical literature since the 1990s has ascertained the extent to which the 
euro area satisfied the various criteria for an OCA and whether there is a case for a fiscal 
union or fiscal federalism to supplement the MU. 
 
2.3.1 Asymmetric shocks? 
 
The literature assesses the extent to which the euro area is subject to idiosyncratic shocks 
defined as different economic disturbances that are either initially different or affect 
regions in different ways. Eichengreen (1997b) finds that asymmetric disturbances, 
measured by the real exchange rate, are more variable in Europe than in the U.S.. Other 
evidence by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) and von Hagen and Neumann (1994) 
complement these results. According to Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) “These studies 
uniformly point to the conclusion that adjustment to region-specific shocks , whether by 
market or by policy, is faster in the USA than in Europe.” 
 
2.3.2  Labor Mobility 
 
De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993) report very low migration within the European 
countries. Eichengreen (1993) finds that interregional mobility is much is much more 
sensitive to changes in wage differentials in the U.S. than in the UK and in Italy. Obstfeld 
and Peri(1998) find that there is little migration in response to asymmetric shocks  within 
European countries, relative to the U.S..  The literature suggests that intraregional 
mobility in the euro area is low. International migration in the euro area will probably be 
even lower since language and culture add further barriers to labor mobility. 
 
 2.3.3 Wage and Price flexibility 
 
The empirical evidence indicates that both wages and prices are sticky in the short run, 
indicating a costly adjustment to negative shocks, involving an increase in 
unemployment.  One recent study by Dessy (2004) analyses wage dynamics using the 
European Community Household Panel data for 12 countries 1994-96. She finds a high 
degree of nominal wage rigidity for all the countries. Thus wage/price flexibility in the 
euro area do not seem to be very helpful in accommodating idiosyncratic shocks. 
 
2.3.4 Risk sharing mechanisms. 
. 
The early OCA literature emphasized the role of government based risk sharing 
mechanisms consisting of transfers and other discretionary grants. Initial evidence by 
Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) showed for the U.S. that a one dollar drop in state income 
could be compensated by an increase in net transfers by 60 cents, while Eichengreen 
(1997a, 1997b) calculated that fiscal transfers between the member states of the EU was 
only a fraction of the U.S. magnitudes. According to Hartland (1949), fiscal federal 
transfers served to offset much of the interregional losses following the collapse of the 
U.S. banking system in the 1930s. However recent work (Von Hagen 2000, Obstfeld and 
Peri 1998, Melitz and Zumer 2002, Balli and Sorensen 2007) has greatly diminished the    16
size of the offsets estimated by Sala-i-Martin and Sachs and by Eichengreen  to between 
5% and 15%. 
 
The recent evidence on risk sharing finds that for the U.S., the capital markets provide 
most of the insurance against idiosyncratic shocks (Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha 1996, 
Melitz 2004).  Europe lags behind the U.S. in pooling risks through portfolio 
diversification (Melitz 2004) but the borrowing channel is almost as well developed in 
the EU as the U.S. ( Bali and Sorensen 2007). Increasing financial integration in the EU 
although less than the U.S. suggests an even stronger contribution of financial markets to 
risk sharing. Finally recent evidence (Melitz 2004, Kalemli-Oczan et al 2004, Balli and 
Sorensen 2007) finds that financial and real integration in the EU has increased the 
symmetry of business cycles. This again may reduce the need for accomodation of 
idiosyncratic shocks through risk sharing mechanisms. This is in line with the hypothesis 
of endogeneity of currency unions advanced by Frankel and Rose (1998). 
 
2.4  Monetary and Fiscal Unions: History and Current Practice 
 
The argument by Eichengreen (1991) and others that fiscal federalism can offset the 
effects of asymmetric shocks and improve upon the operation of a monetary union 
depends on a number of assumptions which may not hold. To isolate the characteristics 
that make fiscal unions successful we describe the historical experience of several fiscal 
unions: the United States; Argentina and Germany. The first can be viewed as a 
successful fiscal union. Canada and Australia have had similar experiences. The second, 
Argentina can be viewed as a less successful MU. Brazil may fit into the same category. 
Germany is an intermediate case. 
 
2.4.1 The United States 
 
The history of U.S. fiscal federalism goes back to the constitution of 1789. After the 
Declaration of Independence in 1776, The Articles of Confederation created a league of 
sovereign states in which the Congress did not have the power of taxation, or the power 
to control trade or the currency. This arrangement was unsuccessful largely: because of 
spillover effects of each states independent monetary and fiscal policy; because of the 
impediments to a free market; and the weakness of Congress. The Constitution of 1789 
gave the Federal Government the power to collect taxes and tariffs and to issue currency 
and to provide the public goods of defense and international diplomacy. The tenth 
amendment declared that all powers not expressly delegated to the federal government by 
the Constitution were preserved for the states. This laid the foundation for the concept of 
states rights, limited national government and dual spheres of authority between the state 
and federal governments. 
 
The period from 1789 to 1901 was the era of Dual Federalism, characterized by little 
collaboration between the federal and state governments. In the 1830s many states ran 
large fiscal deficits to finance infrastructure projects. In the face of a major international 
financial crisis and fiscal shock in the years 1837 to 1840, many states faced insolvency 
and demanded a bailout by the Congress. This was refused leading to widespread defaults   17
in 1840. Thus the federal government sent a costly signal of the limits to its commitments 
to the states. As a result the states have approximate fiscal sovereignty. 
 
Between 1901 and 1960 cooperation and collaboration between various levels of 
government increased. The defining moment in the U.S. fiscal federalism was the Great 
Depression (Bordo, Goldin and White 1998). In the face of the massive decline in real 
income, the states were unable to raise the revenue necessary to meet unavoidable 
expenditure. In 1933, as a major component of the New Deal, President Roosevelt greatly 
expanded the role of the federal government in the domestic economy. In the 1930s there 
was a massive shift in expenditure from the local to the state and federal levels. Before 
1932 the relative shares of government expenditures were: 50% local, 20% state and 30% 
federal government. After 1940 the shares were: local 30%, state 24% and 46% federal 
(Oates and Wallis 1998). Most of the increase in government expenditure came in 
programs administered at the federal level in cooperation with state and local 
governments. 
 
Creative federalism from 1960-68 further shifted the power relationship between 
government levels toward the federal government through the expansion of the grant in 
aid system and the increasing use of regulations. Since 1970 there has been some 
devolution of powers back to the states. 
 
2.4.2  Argentina 
 
Argentina is a federal republic with 24 provinces. It was born out of the union of colonial 
regions with differing economic and social characteristics. The establishment of a 
national government and a constitution took almost four decades accompanied by violent 
struggle. The Constitution gave the provinces priority over the nation. 
 
The Great Depression, although milder in impact than in the U.S. also led to major 
changes in the role of government. The key events of the 1930s were the abandonment of 
a currency board linked to gold and the creation of a central bank (Della Paolera and 
Taylor 1999). The Depression led to the insolvency of many of the provinces. They were 
bailed out by transfers from the federal government financed by paper money issues by 
the central bank. The Depression also spawned an increase in both the federal and state 
government’s shares in national income. 
 
In subsequent decades the states kept running large fiscal deficits which were financed by 
transfers and loans from the federal government and by loans from the provincial banks. 
These loans were then discounted at the central bank. By the late 1980’s Argentina had a 
hyperinflation. It was ended by the 1991 Convertibility Law which established a currency 
board arrangement ending inflationary central bank financing of public sector deficits at 
all levels. 
 
By the mid 1990s many provinces again began running large deficits which were funded 
by national treasury bonds. In 2002, Argentina suffered a serious debt, banking and 
currency crisis which ended the Convertibility Law. Many commentators have attributed   18
the 2002 crisis to irresponsible behavior by the provinces and the subsequent run up in 
the national debt to GDP ratio. 
 
2.4.3  Germany 
 
The Federal Republic of Germany consists of a federal government, 16 Länder (state) 
governments and numerous municipal governments. The national unification of Germany 
in 1871 was based on a strong tradition of regional governments. After unification of the 
German Reich total government spending increased from 10% of GDP in 1881 to 18% in 
1913 with an increase in the central government’s share from 3% to 6%. 
 
The Weimar Republic was founded as a“decentralized unitary state” after the defeat of 
World War I, and experienced dramatic shocks in quick succession: the hyperinflation of 
1922-23, the stabilization of 1923-4, and the Great Depression. The Nazi regime after 
1933 created a unitary state with all power held by the central government while the 
states were relegated to administrative districts. 
 
After World War II, a federal state was created based on Länder which were conceived as 
state units. They were given considerable power. The German system is less cooperative 
and more competitive than federations like the U.S., Canada and Switzerland. Although 
the central government officially follows the no bailout rule, the commitment is not fully 
credible and this can create an incentive by the Länder to borrow excessively. This was 
the case in the 1970s and 1980s when the Länder of Bremen and Saarland received 
special supplementary transfers from the federal government. Many have argued that the 
large debts of the Länder are largely responsible for Germany’s breach in recent years of 
EU’s Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
2.5  Some Lessons from History. 
 
The brief historical comparison of three fiscal unions has some relevance for the case for 
a fiscal union for the EU. First, we observe that all of the fiscal unions were preceded by 
political unions. In each case independent regions decided to found a union because of 
military insecurity and a consequent need for common defense or the desire to be 
independent of foreign powers. Second, institutional development in these federations 
was driven by exceptional events, often economic disasters. The best example is the 
Great Depression which affected the institutions at all levels of government. In all cases it 
lent to an increase in government power and its centralization. Third, institutional 
evolution worked through an “institutional learning by doing” process. Not all the 
federations learned from their negative experiences of the past. In the presence of moral 
hazard the Federal Government has to give a signal of commitment and often a lesson to 
the sub-national authorities, otherwise they do not learn. Thus the U.S. Federal 
government taught the right lesson to the states in 1840 that there would be no bailout of 
their debt. This was not the case in Argentina or Germany. In the case of Argentina (and 
Brazil) there is still no credible mechanism to impose fiscal discipline. 
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3  Future Challenges facing EMU 
 
Institutions may be conceived of as continually evolving systems of rules, that depend for 
their legitimacy on a relatively widely shared consensus that they are not actively 
dysfunctional.  They are not usually transformed without a major crisis.  This paper tries 
to evolve a few lessons that can be learnt about transformative crises in the histories of 
national currencies and national central banks.  In the past, central banks, and the 
currencies they managed, have been discredited or put under severe strain as a result of 
•  severe or endemic fiscal problems creating pressures for the monetization of public 
debt  
•  low economic growth may produce demands for central banks to pursue more 
expansionary policies 
•  regional strains producing a demand for different monetary policies to adjust to 
particular regional pressures (such conflicts have played an important part in the near 
or actual break up of federations) 
•  severe crises of the financial system (which discredited the central banks of the 
interwar era) 
•  tensions between the international and the domestic role of a leading currency 
produced conflicts about British monetary policy in the 1920s and about U.S. policy 
in the 1960s and 1970s. 
How far do there exist analogies between the circumstances that produced these historical 
problems and the likely development of the euro? 
 
3.1 The fiscal dilemma 
 
The extreme fiscal strains that destroyed monetary regimes such as that of the French 
revolutionary regime, or of Russia and the central European states in the first decades of 
the twentieth century, were the result of prolonged and intense military conflict of a type 
that is no longer conceivable in contemporary Europe.  But in the second half of the 
twentieth century all industrialized states, including especially those of western Europe, 
experienced a sustained rise in government expenditure that was historically unique in 
that it was not an accompaniment of war.  While it is often argued that the increase in 
such expenditure has made the states concerned more socially stable and also more 
resilient to economic shocks, there is also a limit to that expansion of public sector 
activity.  At some stage, a society reaches the limit of the impositions it can bear. 
 
In a globalized world, there is increasing pressure to reduce rates of taxation, especially 
corporate taxation.  The accession to the EU of new member countries with a low tax 
regime (notably the flat tax regimes of Estonia and Slovakia) has produced additional tax 
competition within the EU.  On the other hand, the political pressures that result in rising 
demand for public services are continually increasing.  The ageing of the population, and 
the increased technical availability of expensive medical treatments, add to those 
pressures. 
 
One way of solving the fiscal dilemma in the past was inflation.  In the 1970s and 1980s 
Europe, and the world, had generally high levels of inflation.  But it was also increasingly   20
recognized that such inflation imposed a cost because it distorted incentives; and at 
higher levels, it provoked considerable political unease.  One way of seeing the evolution 
of an increasingly hard European Monetary System, and then the European Monetary 
Union, is as a mechanism for the imposition of external discipline. The European 
framework made it easier for governments to press on with reforms to limit expenditure, 
that could be presented to hostile parliaments and pressure groups as an unavoidable part 
of an exercise in integration that promised substantial long run benefits.  Within the EMS, 
however, some countries still experienced considerable fiscal pressure; and fiscal stimuli 
translated into increased demand, increased prices and a real exchange rate appreciation 
that threatened competitiveness.  These countries could still in the EMS resort to an 
exchange rate realignment (as in 1992, where pressure in Italy set off a general 
realignment). 
 
The monetary union obviously prevents such adjustment measures being undertaken by 
national policy-makers.  The only (partially effective) substitute left is fiscal measures to 
compensate firms for real exchange rate appreciation.  But such  measures have a fiscal 
cost. 
 
The most obvious threat to the single currency is usually held to arise out of the imperfect 
control and coordination of national fiscal policies.  Some commentators argue as a result 
that monetary unions produce an inexorable dynamic in the direction of fiscal unions.   
 
The stability criteria in the Maastricht Treaty were the subject of immensely protracted 
and complicated negotiation, and were intended to address this problem.  In the aftermath 
of the recession of 2000-1, and of Europe’s weak growth performance, substantial 
pressure from the large states led to some loosening of the criteria.  When most of the 
large member states broke the rules, the then President of the Commission, Romano 
Prodi, referred to the pact as absurd, and a 2005 summit formally modified the rule so as 
to make it more flexible in the face of cyclical downturns. 
 
A formalized system of fiscal federalism would however not necessarily deal with the 
problems of fiscal indiscipline on the part of member states.  Indeed, the expectation of 
institutionalized transfers or bailouts following fiscal problems might well be expected to 
increase the incentives for bad behavior.  Stricter observance of the existing system and 
its rules, on the other hand, might lead to pressure to reform.  Fiscal reforms would in the 
longer run be expected to raise the rate of growth.  
 
3.2 Growth rates 
 
The growth rate of the economy is a central determinant of the likely long run success of 
the euro.  For reasons that will be discussed below, low growth, or very different rates of 
growth in different parts of the Euro area, would be likely to raise political questions and 
produce political tensions around the setting of the common or single monetary policy.  
Both the ability to comply with the Maastricht criteria, and the political tolerance of an 
autonomous central bank, are highly dependent on the overall rate of economic growth.  
The revival of growth in Europe since 2005 has brought a reduction in the deficits, but   21
they will reappear should there be a renewed faltering. In the longer term (as in other rich 
industrial countries), the additional costs imposed by increased life expectancy, an ageing 
population structure, and rising health costs are likely to impose a heavy strain.  
Forecasting long-run developments involves many uncertainties, but almost every 
contemporary prognosis sees Europe as growing significantly slower than other parts of 
the world.  Robert Fogel in a recent overview suggested a rate of real GDP growth for the 
period 2000-2040 of 1.2 percent for the industrialized EU-15, a slightly higher figure 
than the 1.1 percent for Japan, but much lower than the 3.8 percent for the United states 
or 7.1 percent for India or 8.4 percent for China (Fogel 2007).   
 
The relatively poor growth performance is conventionally explained by inflexible labor 
markets and by more limited capital markets that make venture capital harder and scarcer.  
In both areas, the introduction of the single currency has brought greater flexibility, but 
one other brake on European growth remains widely recognized but poorly counter-acted 
in policy terms.  The Lisbon Agenda included an opening up of services, yet this is the 
area where the most restrictions still apply, and where national governments are 
powerfully pressed to resist attempts on an EU-wide basis to introduce greater elements 
of competition.  The services directive was effectively so watered down in 2007 by 
national politics that little remains of the reform initiative.  There is in short, especially at 
a national level, a critical resistance to important elements of the liberalizing agenda.  The 
blockage is historically disappointing, in that in the early stages of European integration 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the European authorities enforced a highly competitive market in 
the dynamic sectors of the time, in manufacturing, while offering compensation to the 
less dynamic agricultural sector.  This highly successful strategy would, if translated into 
today’s circumstances, involve enforcing a high level of competition in the dynamic areas 
of today, mostly services, while providing safety nets to those affected by the relative 
decline of Europe’s competitive advantage in some areas of manufacturing.  But the 
vision of the European Union as providing enhanced competition has not been universal 
or pervasive, and the consequences has been sub-optimal growth.  
 
There is a political economy reason to worry about the effects of low growth on the euro, 
and to see it as politically vulnerable to backlashes against globalization.  In many parts 
of Europe, globalization is widely seen as a major threat to the social order; and the 
resentments are used by politicians eager to establish a higher political profile.  Workers, 
especially in manufacturing, are faced with a threat of job losses or radical reductions in 
income as a consequence of low wage competition from Asia or from eastern Europe.  
Workers in manufacturing and in services are worried about the effects of immigration on 
income levels.  Politically, the backlash against globalization is associated with the 
extremes of left and right, which often take their themes and rhetorical engagement from 
each other.  But since the conventional right and the conventional left compete against 
each other, and need to mobilize as many votes as possible, they are also likely to take up 
some of the anti-globalization language in order to maximize their support and prevent a 
slippage of voters to the extremes.  Sometimes they will also experience pressure to 
transform this rhetoric into policy. 
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The anti-globalization movement however finds it hard to identify concrete targets 
against which to direct the widespread malaise.  Protests directed against American fast 
food restaurants do not really seem adequately to confront the issues raised by 
globalization.  In consequence, the single currency has already become a popular 
whipping boy for anti-globalization sentiment.  It is blamed for price increases of some 
consumer items: in Germany, popular newspapers launched campaigns detailing the 
effects of the “Teuro” (expensive Euro; teuer = expensive).  In Italy, some very 
prominent consumer items became very much more expensive (coffee by 30 percent and 
pizza by 16 percent).
3 
 
The immediate wave of dissatisfaction surrounding the introduction of the euro quickly 
ebbed.  But it holds an instructive lesson: the episode was used by governments, and 
governments took at least some part in the mobilization of critical opinion.  The German 
Finance Minister Hans Eichel endorsed the view that the euro had led to price increases, 
and the Consumer Affairs Minister Renate Künast created an office to marshal 
complaints from customers.  The Greek Socialist government under Costas Simitis 
encouraged a one day boycott of shops. 
 
A major feature in anti-globalization sentiment is the belief that some protection against 
the forces of the world economy is needed.  According to this view, the primary 
obligation of the political system is to steer or cushion the process of globalization: to 
stop takeovers by predatory investment groups (in German referred to as locusts or 
Heuschrecken); to protect local jobs; and to provide credit to lack business.  An obvious 
corollary to this argumentation sees a national currency as a better carapace than a 
Europeanized currency.  The necessity of a common monetary policy requires interest 
rates that are “too high” in some countries and areas (higher that the rate that would be 
desirable if a local central bank were setting rates).   
 
Consequently, interests that demand a monetary policy more focused on growth are 
usually critical of the ECB; and in some cases (such as the Italian Liga Nord) see a return 
to national money as an appropriate solution.  In the 2007 French presidential election, 
Nicolas Sarkozy derived considerable mileage from criticism of the ECB, and then 
repeated the criticism after the election.  The inclusion of the ECB as an institution of the 
European Union in the slimmed down and revised constitutional treaty raises the 
possibility that a formal mechanism will evolve for putting pressure on the ECB to make 
growth as well as price stability an objective of policy.  
 
At present, the signs of such a use of the euro as a focus of globalization fears are 
relatively weak.  Indeed, the euro is generally quite popular – more so than at its launch 
as a circulating currency in 2002.  Since the Maastricht Treaty, and even more 
dramatically since the introduction of the euro, public opinion surveys conducted by 
Eurobarometer have shown increasing degrees of support for the single currency (2000: 
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53 percent; 2004: 62 percent; 2005: 65 percent).
4  But these figures also reflect a general 
increase in satisfaction that accompanies better economic performance, and they are 
likely to reverse at the onset of economic difficulties or even a slowdown of growth. 
 
3.3 Regional pressures 
 
Regions with different growth patterns or different political economies are likely to press 
for different monetary policies, and in a democratic setting the result might be extreme 
polarization and conflict.  Such polarization occurred in many gold standard countries in 
the late nineteenth century, when farming regions believed that they would benefit from 
the abandonment of a deflationary gold regime and the adoption of a bimetallic standard.  
In the United States, the agrarian mid-West and the South were pitted against the North-
east; in Germany there was a similar divide between a grain-producing East and the 
industrial areas of western Germany.  Until a general price rise occurred after the 
discovery of gold in Alaska, Australia and South Africa in the last years of the century, 
monetary policy was highly politicized. In more extreme settings, federations can even 
break up. In the last years of the Yugoslav Federation, as democratization began, a gap 
opened up between the industrially stagnant Serb areas and more dynamic regions in the 
north, and fuelled an ethnic conflict that had not been a prominent part of most of the 
experience of postwar Yugoslavia.  For the non-Serbs, the realization that Serbians were 
imposing an inflation (and using the fiscal proceeds of inflation to finance their own 
goals) made a breakup of the Federation an urgent political demand for Slovenes, Croats 
and tragically also for Bosnians.  Similarly, in post-1918 Germany, the idea that Berlin 
was promoting an inflationary policy to its own advantage prompted Rhineland, Saxon 
and Bavarian separatism and a “Los von Berlin” movement. 
 
These may appear to be extreme and problematic precedents.  But very different 
economic experiences undoubtedly promote feelings of regional and sometimes even of 
ethnic difference.  Given Europe’s highly troubled twentieth century history, many 
responsible policy-makers are worried about a resurgence of historical divides. 
 
We should distinguish between shorter term and longer term problems.  One potential 
source of difficulty in the shorter term horizon lies in the expansion of the euro area. 
Introducing the euro (in the recent EU accession countries) or pegging to the euro in 
other countries (or even adopting the euro as a currency as has already been undertaken 
in Montenegro and Kosovo) is likely to be an increasingly attractive option.  Countries 
see the euro as an external anchor that can give a powerful anti-inflationary credibility.  
 
The extension of the euro to new accession countries (which is a requirement of the 
accession treaties, rather than being a political option) in itself will create new challenges.  
This issue has already been widely debated in regard to the adoption of the euro by the 
Baltic states.  The new member countries are powerfully growing emerging market 
economies, which experience and will continue to experience rising inflation as prices for 
services rise, corresponding to the increased incomes producers of tradables derive from 
selling to global markets (Belassa effect).  Correspondingly, the mature markets of the 
                                                 
4   http://www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/standard_eb_trend/trend/currency.htm   24
west are likely to experience periodic bouts of anxiety about deflation (and anxiety about 
excessively tight ECB policy), as competition on markets for tradable goods and services 
drives down prices.   
 
The EU requirement that these two types of countries (emerging central European 
markets on the one hand, and the mature economies of western Europe on the other) have 
a single currency or a permanent fix is likely to produce serious problems in one or both.  
The mature markets should have monetary policies that are less restricted than they were 
in the past by fears of deflation.  They will experience substantial pressure for a more 
growth-oriented monetary policy.  On the other hand, the emerging markets should be 
free to conduct tighter policies to minimize the possibilities of destabilizing surges in 
asset prices. 
 
Monetary policy in the mature market economies is likely to come under populist 
pressure to respond to weak economic growth.  Yet without continued immigration, 
which is also likely to produce populist backlashes, the chances of overcoming the 
demographic deficits are substantially reduced. 
 
In the longer run, there is a different sort of question about growth in the European 
setting.  Will there be unequal growth across the European Union, with faster growth in 
the catch-up economies of central and eastern Europe?  At present, the disparity in 
growth is very apparent, and is causing significant problems for the formulation of an 
appropriate monetary policy (see below); but in the longer run, these disparities may 
disappear.  The major channel here is migration flows: the inflow of central Europeans to 
Britain, Ireland and Sweden (the three EU countries with no control on movements from 
the new member countries) since 2005 has significantly raised growth rates in those 
recipient economies. 
 
Conversely, the outflow from eastern and central Europe of the most skilled and active 
sectors of the labor force is likely to reduce the growth potential in the long run, and 
create the fiscal problems associated with ageing and with demographic imbalances 
elsewhere in the EU. By 2025 a fifth to a quarter of the East European population is 
estimated to be 65 or older.  The World Bank takes this argument to forecast a sharp 
reduction in growth in eastern Europe, which it terms “from red to gray” (World Bank 
2007).  Low growth rates are likely to become a common European destiny. 
  
3.4 Financial Stability  
 
In the past, financial sector shocks have played a decisive role in the undermining of 
monetary regimes and the discrediting of the central banks responsible for their 
operation.  The most dramatic of such episodes occurred in the interwar Great 
Depression, where banking panics in central Europe and the United States exacerbated 
the problems of the real economy.  Unstable banks withdrew credits from borrowers, 
forcing firms that would otherwise have been solvent to liquidate stock at depressed 
prices.  The major industrial countries that had significant banking problems fared 
significantly worse than those economies with no or only limited banking collapses.  In   25
particular the United States, with waves of banking panics after the fall of 1930, and 
Germany, with a meltdown of the banking system in June and July 1931, were very badly 
hit by the real consequences of the financial storm. 
 
The weakness of the American and German banks in the interwar era was at least in some 
measure the consequence of political federalism.  Federalism 
1. encouraged the development of a banking system that was regional in character.  In 
particular in the United States, state banks suffered because their risk was concentrated in 
particular sectors. 
2. made for inefficiencies in regulating banks. In Germany, a major source of difficulty 
was the parallel system of Savings Banks (Sparkassen) which were controlled by local 
authorities, and which responded to local political pressures to lend.   
3. produced a dispute about the appropriate monetary response of the central banking 
institutions.  This may be an especially acute problem in the early life of the federation or 
the central bank.  With regard to the United States, Eichengreen (1992) and Wheelock 
(2000) showed how the Federal Reserve found it difficult to resolve regional conflicts in 
the early 1920s.  Friedman and Schwartz famously presented a major cause of the 
immobilization of the Federal Reserve System after 1930 as lying in tensions between the 
New York and Chicago Banks. 
 
Europe is an integrated capital market with national bank regulators that respond in 
different ways to incipient problems.  Since the 1980s, and especially since the 
introduction of the single currency, the Euro-zone capital market has become partially 
integrated, but there are still in some countries substantial impediments to cross-national 
financial ownership. Nevertheless, financial institutions operate in this single capital 
market across national boundaries.  Big mergers, such as those between Santander and 
Abbey National in 2004 and Unicredito and Hypervereinsbank (which had previously 
acquired a dominant share in the Austrian banking industry) in 2005, have started to 
create Europe-wide superbanks.   
 
The problem of a bank getting into difficulties because of engagements in a different 
country is a widely recognized problem, in theoretical discussions.  But a unification of 
banking regulation is still a long way from being realized.   
 
At the same time as finance has become internationalized, each country preserves its own 
idiosyncratic system of financial supervision and regulation.  Though there has been an 
extensive discussion of the possibility of shifting supervision to the European level (Prati 
and Schinasi 1999;), there are practical obstacles to making such a shift (apart from 
inbuilt bureaucratic resistance from existing regulators).  In particular, regulation is often 
linked to implicit or explicit lender of last resort functions.  But such activity has a 
significant fiscal cost, which at present cannot be assumed at a European level but would 
remain an issue for national governments and national parliaments.  Much of the previous 
literature has concentrated in consequence on the issue of how bailouts and rescues 
should be paid for after a financial crisis, as a consequence of the reluctance of national 
authorities (and their tax payers) to bear the financial burden of bailing out depositors or 
creditors in other states (Goodhart and Schoenmaker 2006).  The current institutional   26
framework unambiguously limits socially beneficial post-crisis workouts.  But it may 
also limit the capacity to provide efficient preventative or pre-crisis prudential 
supervision.  The consequent limits on the extent to which national regulators were aware 
of bank problems became highlighted in the credit crunch of the summer of 2007.  The 
ECB supplied general liquidity to the market, and may have been able to avoid some 
financial distress.  But it does not have a responsibility to regulate and thus may not be 
aware of banking problems until a late stage.  
 
Additionally, in the event of financial sector difficulty, the monetary policy response 
would be highly contested. Conventionally, bailout or reorganization is seen as the 
answer to solvency problems, while liquidity provision is an answer for solvent but 
temporarily illiquid institutions.  In crisis situations, and where information about credit 
risk is faulty or incomplete, as in the summer of 2007, such a judgment between solvency 
and liquidity problems is impossible to undertake.  In the absence of an ability to deal 
specifically with the threat posed by individual institutions and to make choices about 
crisis support or closing the institution, there will be more pressure on the ECB to simply 
deal with the situation by extending large amounts of liquidity rather than to address the 
solvency issues which may be concealed.  
 
The difficulty of an effective Europe-wide response to financial sector problems thus 
reflects a more general problem with respect to the making of monetary policy: there may 
be a different political economy of money in regions of the Euro-zone and EU member 
countries, leading to contradictory pressures on policy. 
 
3.5 The Euro as an international currency 
 
Another set of contradictory pressures on policy arises out of the increasingly important 
international role of the euro.  The euro quickly became the second largest reserve 
currency of the world: the IMF’s figures show for December 2006 the euro accounting 
for 25.8 percent of world declared reserves, with the dollar at 64.7 percent (these figures 
however only cover around half the world’s total reserves, with another quarter held in 
undeclared currencies, and a further quarter in also generally hidden sovereign wealth 
funds outside the control of central banks) (ECB 2007).  The euro has also become the 
second largest currency for the issuance of securities.  For short-term international debt 
issue, in the last quarter of 2006, it had a share of 34 percent (with the U.S. at 40 percent). 
 
The euro is attractive to some countries and governments because it is not the dollar.  
While the international role of the dollar is deeply associated with the political 
preeminence of the United States, the euro is not the currency of a superpower or even of 
a conventional state.  For general political strategy reasons it looks more attractive.  
Russia in particular has made an explicitly political point in progressively raising the 
weight of the euro in its operational currency basket (from 35 to 40 percent in December 
2005 and then again to 45 percent in February 2007).   
 
But there is also an economic rationale in terms of diversification.  The euro is not as 
precariously dependent on continued capital inflows as is the dollar.  It may also appear   27
better on more technical policy grounds.  As a consequence of the complicated 
institutional structure guaranteeing the independence of the European Central Bank, it 
appears to be less vulnerable to political pressure.  On the other hand, especially in the 
response to the dollar depreciation of 2007 and the French presidential elections, there 
have been unmistakable attempts at influence.    
 
Considerations such as greater independence and a healthier Euro-zone current account 
may make the euro desirable as an international currency: as a reserve currency, as a store 
of value, as a benchmark for the pricing of internationally traded commodities. But a 
potential development of the euro as the major international currency poses policy 
problems analogous to those faced by Britain and the Bank of England in the nineteenth 
century and by the United States and the Federal Reserve System in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  What are the ECB’s global obligations as to the creation of liquidity in 
the case of emerging market crises?  How should the ECB support the U.S. dollar in 
order to forestall a dollar collapse which would be harmful for Europe in particular as 
well as the world at large?  Would political pressure be stronger or even irresistible in 
these circumstances? 
 
For both the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System, there were moments 
when international considerations seemed to outweigh considerations connected with 
domestic stability.  In the most dramatic of such crises in 1931, the Bank of England was 
largely discredited, and the response to the crisis ended in 1945 with the nationalization 
of the Bank. One widely accepted interpretation of the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
fixed exchange rate regime between 1968 and 1973 is that at crisis moments, the United 
States was unwilling to sacrifice domestic priorities (particularly maintaining fast 
economic growth) for the sake of maintaining an international regime that was in any 
case widely criticized. 
 
By contrast with Britain and the United States, Japan and West Germany took a very 
different stance.  They did not see themselves as political hegemons, and saw a 
widespread use of their currencies as reserves as inherently dangerous, because it would 
make the export economy more vulnerable to unpredictable exchange rate swings.  In 
consequence, the two fast growing big industrial economies of the second half of the 
twentieth century, sought as much as possible to avoid an international role for their 
currencies (as did Switzerland, whose currency also seemed attractive as a stable measure 
of value).    
 
The euro is in a quite different position to the yen or the Deutschemark.  It has inevitably 
become the world’s second reserve currency.  One of the causes of the appreciation of the 
euro is often supposed to lie in the triangular relation between Asia, the United States and 
Europe.  If for trade reasons many Asian economies notably China try to hold their dollar 
exchange rate stable (in the so-called Bretton Woods II regime), exchange rate 
movements arising out of large U.S. deficits mean the appreciation of the Euro.  Even in 
the largely favorable environment of 2002-2007, many European exporters have 
complained about the appreciation of their currency, especially in countries such as Italy 
which compete quite extensively with the textiles, clothing and leather goods production   28
of Asian economies.   In these circumstances, the political debate about the euro can be a 
reflection of much larger concerns with globalization, and of Europe’s perceived 
vulnerability in the face of the challenges that global markets in goods and services will 
pose. 
 
It is – projecting into the future – quite conceivable that there will be moments at which 
massive political pressure, built up by underlying anti-globalization concerns and focused 
on the technical necessities of dealing with major international crises, leads to a serious 




The past experience is of monetary unions developing as part of a process of political and 
consequently fiscal integration.  By contrast, EMU is neither purely a national nor purely 
an international monetary union, but has characteristics of both types, because the 
transfer of sovereignty is incomplete.  This may mean that objections that it is not an 
OCA are misplaced, because the workings of an integration process are likely also to 
induce moves toward a closer approximation to an OCA.  The incomplete transfer of 
sovereignty on the other hand means that there are substantial political pressures that 
build up in national areas that are no longer also the area of a single currency that can be 
adjusted against external currencies.  There may be a momentum toward further fiscal 
integration, and that will be an indication of success in that the MU is working as similar 
unions did in the past, especially in the case of the U.S. and Germany, and fiscal 
centralization gradually emerged over a rather lengthy period of time.  Analogies with the 
monetary unions of Germany, Italy and the U.S. suggest that the process of evolving a 
fiscal union takes a long time.  The EMU has the additional problem that its area will 
change more dramatically because of the addition of new members, and because of the 
governance issues raised by the non-coincidence of EMU and the EU. 
 
On that long road to more fiscal integration, however, there may be many bumpy areas.  
Some of these bumps cannot easily be measured or mapped in advance.  In particular, 
unpleasant fiscal arithmetic for member countries may produce strain in the area as a 
whole.  Such arithmetic is most likely to arise as a consequence of continually depressed 
rates of growth. One of the benefits that the move to the single currency brought was a 
reduction of interest rates that might lead to better fiscal performance but also better 
growth performance.  But supposing that this stimulus is not adequate, and the euro area 
continues to face sluggish growth? In order to reap the benefits of a better growth 
performance, competitive stimuli as well as a low interest environment are needed, but 
EU countries have been slow in opening up the potentially fast growing services sector to 
competition. 
 
Low growth will also produce direct challenges to the management of the currency, and a 
demand for a more politically controlled and for a more expansive monetary policy.  
Such demands might arise in some parts or regions or countries of the euro area, but not 
in others.  They would lead to a politically highly difficult discussion of monetary 
governance.  This discussion will be more difficult if there is a widespread perception   29
that the international role of the euro is at odds with domestic political demands that the 
currency should be supportive or sustaining of growth.  Financial sector instability, with a 
potential need for bank bailouts, could also be a source of difficulty.  Finally, in addition 
to all these threats, domestic responses to the challenge of globalization in markets for 
goods and services may also be displaced into a discussion of the euro, with the single 
currency and the central bank that manages it taking the position of fall guy for 
radicalized and generalized discontent.  On the other hand, if all these bumps are 
overcome, and a process of gradual transfer of fiscal responsibility toward greater 
centralization occurs, there is the possibility that the euro zone with match the 
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